The Progressivity of Social Security by Julia Lynn Coronado et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We are grateful for helpful suggestions from Martin Feldstein, Wei-Yin Hu, Jeff Liebman, Gib Metcalf, Maria
Perozek,  Jim  Poterba,  Jon  Skinner  and  Al  Teplin.  This paper is part of the NBER program in Public
Economics.  Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the Federal Reserve Board
or the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2000 by Julia Lynn Coronado, Don Fullerton, and Thomas Glass.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.The Progressivity of Social Security
Julia Lynn Coronado, Don Fullerton, and Thomas Glass
NBER Working Paper No. 7520
February 2000
JEL No. H22, H55
ABSTRACT
How much does the current social security system really redistribute from rich to poor?  We use
the PSID to estimate lifetime wage profiles and actual earnings each year for a sample of 1778 individuals,
and we use mortality probabilities to calculate expected payroll taxes and social security benefits.  For a
given set of “facts” about the net flows received by each individual, measured progressivity depends on
many assumptions.  This paper attempts to capture and to quantify all of the individual characteristics that
are relevant to determine the progressivity of a life-cycle program like social security.
We proceed in seven steps.  First, we classify individuals by annual income and use Gini coefficients
to find that social security is highly progressive.  Second, we reclassify individuals on the basis of lifetime
income and find that social security is less progressive.  Third, we remove the cap on measured earnings
and find that social security is even less progressive.  Fourth, we switch from actual to potential lifetime
earnings (the present value of the wage rate times 4000 hours each year).  This measure captures the value
of leisure and home production, so those out of the labor force are less poor, and net payments to them
are less progressive.  Fifth, we assign to each married individual half of the couple’s income.  The low-wage
spouse is then not so poor, and social security becomes even less progressive.  Sixth, we incorporate
mortality probabilities that differ by potential lifetime income.  Since the rich live longer and collect benefits
longer, social security is no longer progressive.  Finally, we increase the discount rate from 2% to 4%,
which puts relatively more weight on the earlier-but-regressive payroll tax and less weight on the later-but-
progressive benefit schedule.  The whole social security system is then regressive.
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